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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOURTH AMENDMENT
ORDERING PASSENGERS OUT OF VEHICLE DURING TRAFFIC STOP -

-

The Supreme Court of the United States held that a police officer
who orders passengers to exit a vehicle until completion of a
traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution because the public interest in the safety of law
enforcement personnel outweighs an individual's right to be free
from arbitrary interference.
Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
Respondent, Jerry Lee Wilson ("Wilson"), was a passenger in a
southbound automobile on Interstate 95 ("1-95") in Baltimore
County, Maryland.' The vehicle did not display a regular license
plate, but only a piece of paper with the words "Enterprise
Rent-A-Car" hung on the rear of the car.2 A Maryland state trooper,
Officer David Hughes ("Hughes"), observed the car traveling at 64
miles per hour in a zone posted at 55 miles per hour.3 The state
trooper turned on his sirens and lights, but the vehicle continued
4
for another mile and a half before finally coming to a stop.
When the driver got out of the car to meet the approaching
trooper, he was trembling and appeared extremely nervous. 5 After
instructing the driver to return to the car and retrieve the rental
documents, Hughes noticed that the front-seat passenger, Wilson,
was sweating and also appeared extremely nervous.6 Hughes then
ordered Wilson to exit the car while the driver sat in the driver's
7
seat looking for the rental papers.
Complying with Officer Hughes' command, Wilson began to exit
the car.8 As he was getting out of the vehicle, Hughes observed a
quantity of crack cocaine fall to the ground. 9 Hughes subsequently
1. Maryland v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1 (1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
2. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 884 (1997).
3. Id.
4. Id. During this mile and a half pursuit, the trooper noticed that the two passengers
in the car turned to look at him several times, repeatedly ducking below sight level and then
reappearing, causing the trooper to become suspicious. Id.
5. Id. Despite his trembling and nervousness, the driver did produce a valid
Connecticut driver's license. Id.
6. Id.
7. Wi/son, 117 S. Ct. at 884.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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arrested and charged Wilson with possession of cocaine with intent
to distribute. 10
In a pre-trial motion, Wilson moved to suppress the evidence,
arguing that Hughes' action of ordering him out of the car
constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted
Wilson's motion to suppress, a decision affirmed by the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland. 12 The Court of Appeals of Maryland
denied certiorari. 13 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari 4 to determine whether the rule of Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 5 that a police officer may, as a matter of course, order
the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle, extends to
6
passengers as well.'
The Court began its consideration of the case by reaffirming
17
Mimms, an earlier decision regarding Fourth Amendment rights.
In Mimms, two Philadelphia police officers observed Harry Minms
("Mimims") driving a vehicle with an expired license plate.' 8 The
officers stopped Minuns' automobile and asked Minims to step out
of the car and produce the vehicle's registration and his driver's
license. 19 As Minms was getting out of his car, the officers noticed
a large bulge under his jacket. 20 Suspecting that the bulge was a
weapon, the officers frisked Minms and discovered a loaded
10. Id.
11. Id. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. Wilson, 106 Md. App. 24, 664 A.2d 1 (1995). The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland ruled that Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), does not apply to
passengers. Id. (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 13 (1995)).
13. Maryland v. Wilson, 667 A.2d 342 (1995). "Certiorari" is a common law writ issued
by a superior to an inferior court requiring the production of a certified record of a case
tried in the inferior court. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 228 (6th ed. 1990).
14. Maryland v. Wilson, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996).
15. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
16. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109. Police officers observed defendant driving an automobile
with an expired license plate and lawfully stopped the vehicle for the purpose of issuing a
traffic summons. Id. at 107. The officer ordered the defendant to get out of the automobile
notwithstanding the fact that the officers had no reason to suspect foul play and there had
been nothing unusual or suspicious about his behavior. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court found
defendant's Fourth Amendment right was not violated. Id.
17. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884.
18. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 107.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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.38-caliber revolver in his waistband. 21 Mimms was arrested and
subsequently convicted on charges of carrying a concealed deadly
weapon and carrying an unlicensed firearm. 22
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania's decision, 23 by holding that the officers
could constitutionally order the driver out of the automobile
without an articulable suspicion.2 4 The Court explained that the
touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is always the
reasonableness in all circumstances of the particular governmental
invasion into a citizen's personal security. 25 This "reasonableness"
test has been found to depend on balancing the public interest
against an individual's right to be free from arbitrary interference
26
by law enforcement officers.
Regarding the public interest side of the balance, the Court noted
that the practice of ordering drivers out of their vehicles is a
precautionary measure protecting the officer's safety that is both
legitimate and weighty.27 The intrusion into the driver's personal
liberty represents the other side of the Fourth Amendment
balance. 28 The Court deemed the additional intrusion of asking the
driver to step out of his car to be "de minimis" because police had
29
already legitimately stopped the driver's car for a traffic violation.
Thus, the public interest of officer safety outweighed the intrusion
into a driver's personal liberty, leading to the holding that an officer
can order a driver out of his car.30
Following its reaffirmance of Mimms, the Wilson Court
addressed whether the rule of Mimms applied to passengers as
well as to drivers. 31 Looking to the public interest side of the
21. Id.
22. Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed Minms' conviction, holding that
the revolver was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Court's rationale was
that the officer was unable to point to any objective and observable facts to support a
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or that the occupants of the automobile posed any
threat to the officers at the scene. Id. at 108 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 370 A2d 1157,
1160 (1976)).
23. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 370 A.2d 1157 (1976).
24. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 112.
25. Id. at 108-109 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
26. Id. at 109 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)).
27. Id. at 110. In addition, the Court observed that the danger to the officer of standing
by the driver's door and in the path of oncoming traffic might also be substantial. Id.
28.

Id.

29. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109.
30. Id. at 112. The Court concluded that, under these circumstances, any man of
reasonable caution would have likely conducted the search. Id.
31. Id. Wilson urged, and the lower courts agreed, that the Mimms rule did not apply
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balance, the Court held that the same legitimate and significant
interest in officer safety is manifest, whether the occupant asked to
step out of the stopped vehicle is a driver or passenger.3 2 In
analyzing the personal liberty side of the balance, the Court noted
that the interest is stronger for a passenger than for a driver
because although probable cause exists that the driver has
committed a traffic infraction, the passenger has made no overt
actions warranting suspicion,A However, the Court further noted
that the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal because
the passengers are already stopped due to the traffic infraction 4
The Court remarked that the only change in passenger
circumstances is that they would be outside, rather than inside, the
35
stopped car.
In summary, the Court held that the public's interest in officer
safety is substantial, while the additional intrusion on a passenger's
personal liberty is minimal. 36 The Court reversed the judgment of
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, concluding that an
officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car,
37
pending completion of the stop.
Justices Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented, arguing
that the Fourth Amendment forbids usual and capricious seizures
of indisputably innocent citizens. 38 The dissent found that statistics
to Wilson because he was not the driver, but merely a passenger. Id. Maryland argued that
the Court had already decided this question in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047-48
(1983) (holding that police may order persons out of an automobile during a stop for a
traffic violation) and Rakas v. I//inois, 439 U.S. 128, 155 n.4 (1978) (holding that, once a
proper stop is made, passengers in automobiles have no Fourth Amendment right not to be
ordered from the vehicle). In deciding Wilson, the Court held that neither Michigan nor
Rakas constituted binding precedent, because the former statement was dictum and the
latter was contained in a concurring opinion. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885.
32. Id. In 1994, eleven police officers were killed and 5,762 assaulted during traffic
pursuits and stops. Id. (citing Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Law
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 31, 33 (1994)). In addition to the danger posed by
an officer standing in the path of oncoming traffic if a passenger occupies the left rear seat,
more than one occupant of the automobile escalates the possible sources of danger to the
officer. Id. The Court found that a passenger's motivation to engage in violence is every bit
as great as that of the driver, but if a passenger is outside the car, he will not be able to
access any weapons concealed in the car's interior. Id.
33. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
37. Id. The case was remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's
opinion. Id.
38. Id. at 887. Justice Stevens was not concerned with the disposition of this particular
case, but with its application to traffic stops in which no evidence exists for concluding that
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cited by the majority did not support the conclusion that the
Court's ruling will reduce assaults on officers, which sometimes
result in fatalities, because the statistics do not separate incidents
of assault by passengers from those by drivers.3 9 The dissent
expressed its concern that the Court's decision may pose a more
serious threat to individual liberty than the majority realized
because the Court took the unprecedented step of allowing4 °seizures
that are not accompanied by any individualized suspicion.
The history of the Fourth Amendment embodies a general rule
requiring that official searches and seizures be authorized by a
warrant, issued upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describe the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.41 The Supreme Court created an
exception to this rule in the landmark case Terry v. Ohio, which
permitted police to "stop and frisk" suspects.42 According to Justice
Stevens' dissent in Wilson, the majority created yet another
exception to the probable cause rule; an exception that excessively
4
intrudes on individual rights under the Fourth Amendment. 3
Justice Kennedy added a few observations in his separate
dissent. 44 He would have held that the public interest does not
outweigh a passenger's personal liberty interest, finding that
ordering passengers to get out of a car during the course of a
traffic stop was not a de minimis intrusion.45 Kennedy found that
the Court should have followed precedent, which permits vehicle
the police officer may be in danger. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. Id. The dissent reasoned, "[Tihe statistics are as consistent with the hypothesis that
ordering passengers to get out of a vehicle increases the danger of assault as with the
hypothesis that it reduces that risk." Id.
40. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Court assumes "that the
constitutional protection against unreasonable seizures requires nothing more than a
hypothetically rational basis for intrusions on individual liberty." Id.
41. Id. at 889. (quoting Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315 (1921); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)).
42. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Terry Court condoned seizures
supported by specific and articulable facts that did not establish probable cause in
themselves. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
43. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 890.
44. Id. at 889.
45. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 889. (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is apparent that a burden
ccould be placed on thousands of innocent citizens every day. Id. When an officer
commands passengers, innocent of any traffic infraction, to leave the vehicle and stand by
the side of the road in full view of the public, the seizure is serious, not trivial. Id. at 890
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority's rule is of some possible advantage to officers in
only about one out of every twenty thousand traffic stops in which there is a passenger in
the car. Id. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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stops only if some objective indication exists that a violation has
been committed, in reaching its decision.46 According to Kennedy, if
a person is to be seized, a satisfactory explanation for the invasive
action ought to be given. 47 Kennedy further suggested that the
explanation for ordering passengers to exit a vehicle need be no
more than officer safety or facilitation of a lawful search or
investigation.4
In Terry v. Ohio,49 the Supreme Court considered whether the
search of a person based on an officer's suspicion is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. 0 Officer McFadden observed Terry's
casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of a store window and
suspected Terry planned to commit a robbery.51 Considering it his
duty as a police officer and fearing that Terry had a gun, McFadden
seized Terry to search him for weapons. 52 As McFadden patted
down the outside of Terry's overcoat, he felt what might be a
pistol.5 McFadden removed Terry's coat and discovered a
.38-caliber revolverM Terry was subsequently charged with carrying
55
a concealed weapon.
Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court, holding
that the officer did not exceed the reasonable scope of the Fourth
Amendment by patting down Terry's outer clothing. 56 Without
placing his hands in Terry's pockets or under the surface of Terry's
garments until he felt the suspected weapon, McFadden then
merely reached for and removed the gun.57 The Court ruled that
McFadden was justified in conducting a limited search for weapons
after he had reasonably concluded that Terry might be armed and
presently dangerous. 58 The Court determined that to assess the
46. Id. at 890.
47. Id. Justice Kennedy found that "the distinguishing feature of our criminal justice
system is its insistence on principled, accountable decision making in individual cases." Id.
48. Id.
49. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
50. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6 (1968).
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 7.
54. Id. at 7. After Officer McFadden felt the pistol while patting down of the outside of
Terry's overcoat, he reached inside the overcoat pocket, but initially was unable to remove
the gun. Id.
55. Id. Officer McFadden suspected three men, Terry, Chilton, and Katz, of criminal
activity. Id. He patted down each of the suspects and found guns on both Terry and Chilton,
who were formally charged with carrying concealed weapons. Id.
56. Terry, 329 U.S. at 29.
57. Id.
58. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1)).
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reasonableness of the officer's actions under the Fourth
Amendment, it is first necessary to focus upon the governmental
interest that allegedly justifies official intrusion into the
59
constitutionally protected interests of a private citizen.
The standard enunciated in Terry was whether the facts available
to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate." 60 The Court concluded that requiring that police
officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties
would be unreasonable, and in these circumstances, any man of
61
reasonable caution would likely have conducted the "pat down."
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,62 the Supreme Court
analyzed the United States Border Patrol's authority to stop
automobiles in areas near the Mexican border.6 Officers of the
Border Patrol pursued and stopped Brignoni-Ponce's car, testifying
later that their only reason for doing so was that its three
occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent.M After questioning
the respondent and his two passengers, the officers learned that
the passengers had illegally entered the country.6 The Border
Patrol charged Brignoni-Ponce with two counts of knowingly
transporting illegal immigrants, a violation of §274(a)(2) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.r
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to all
seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief
detention short of a traditional arrest.6 7 The Court found that the
Fourth Amendment does not require a police officer, who lacks the
precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest,
simply to shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a
59. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19. Terry addressed more than the general governmental interest
in investigating crime; but also the more immediate interest of the police officer in taling
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Id. at 23. Though the
officer was engaged in investigating crime, the governmental purpose that justified the stop
and patdown was not the investigation itself, but "the neutralization of danger to the
policeman in the investigative circumstance." Id. at 26.
60. Id. at 21-22.
61. Id. at 22.
62. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
63. Brgnoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at 875.
64. Id. at 875.
65. Id.
66. Id. Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 228, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).
67. Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at 878. (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969)).
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criminal to escape. 68 In light of the facts known to an officer at the
time, conducting a brief stop of a suspicious individual to
determine the suspect's identity or to keep the situation under
control while obtaining more information is reasonable.69
The Court concluded that due to the importance of the
governmental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief
stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the
border, when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to
suspect that a particular vehicle may contain illegal aliens, he may
stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that
provoked his suspicion. 70 As with other categories of police action
subject to Fourth Amendment constraints, the reasonableness of
such seizures depends on balancing the public interest and the
individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary
71
interference by law officers.
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms,72 the Supreme Court considered
whether an officer was justified in conducting a limited search for
weapons after he had reasonably concluded that the person whom
he had legitimately stopped might be armed and dangerous. 73 The
Court relied on the precedents of Terry and Brignoni-Ponce in
reaching its decision.74 Under this analysis, the Court ruled that
what is at most a mere inconvenience (the driver being asked to
step out of his vehicle) cannot prevail when balanced against
68. Id. at 881.
69. Id.
70. Id. However, the Court also concluded that it was unwilling to let the Border
Patrol dispense entirely with the requirement that officers must have a reasonable suspicion
to justify roving-patrol stops. Id. at 882.
71. Id. Justice Powell held that the public interest demands effective measures to
prevent the illegal entry of aliens at the Mexican border. Id. In 1974, the Immigration and
Nationality Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee suggested that there may be as
many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally in the country. !id. (citing Hearings on illegal Aliens
before Subcommittee, No. 1 of the House Connittee on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.,
ser. 13, pt. 5, pp. 1323-1325 (1974)). However, Justice Powell concluded that although the
likelihood that a person of Mexican ancestry is an illegal alien is high enough to make
Mexican appearance a relevant factor, standing alone it does not justify stopping all
Mexican-Americans to ask if they are illegally in the United States. Id. at 887.
72. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 109. In Terry, the touchstone of the Court's analysis under the Fourth
Amendment was reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental
invasion of a citizen's personal security. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). In
Brignoni-Ponce, the Court held reasonableness depends on a balance between the public
interest and an individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers. Id. (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
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legitimate concerns for officer safety.7 5
In Rakas v. Illinois,76 the Supreme Court examined whether an
automobile passenger had any legitimate expectation of privacy in
the glove compartment or the area under the seat of the vehicle
sufficient to challenge a search of those areas. 77 After receiving a
robbery report, the police stopped the suspected getaway car,
driven by its owner and in which Rakas was a passenger.7 8 Police
ordered the occupants to exit the car and during the subsequent
vehicle search, found a box of rifle shells in the glove compartment
and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat.7 9 The officers
took the occupants to the police station and subsequently arrested
Rakas, although he was merely a passenger in the vehicle.80
The Court held it unnecessary to decide whether the search of
the car might have violated the Fourth Amendment rights of
someone other than the owner-driver because only he had a
possessory interest in the allegedly private place searched. 81 A
lengthy concurring opinion by Justice Powell reasoned that it was
unrealistic to suggest that an automobile passenger had any
reasonable expectation that police would not search the car in
which he had been riding after it was lawfully stopped and the
occupants ordered to get out.8 2 Justice Powell concluded that
passengers in automobiles have no Fourth Amendment right to
remain in a vehicle, once police make a proper stop. 83 Thus,
75.

Id. at 110. The Court recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he

approaches a person seated in an automobile. Id. (citing Allen P. Bristow, Police Officer
Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. Cmit L C. & P.S. 93 (1963)). The intrusion into the
driver's personal liberty occasioned by an order to get out of the car was described as de
minmis. Id. at 111. The Court reasoned, "[tihe driver is being asked to expose to view very
little more of his person than is already exposed." Id.
76. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
77.
78.

Id.
Id.

79. Id. at 130. The occupants of the car were Rakas and two female companions. Id.
80.

Id.

81. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149. Justice Rehnquist held that Rakas, who did not assert a
property or a possessory interest in the searched automobile or an interest in the property
seized, and who failed to show that he had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove
compartment or area under the seat of the vehicle in which he was merely a passenger, was
not entitled to challenge the search of those areas. Id. at 128. The capacity to claim the
protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place
but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Id. at 143 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967)).
82. Id. at 155. (Powell, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 155, n. 4. (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., concurring). The majority
opinion indicated that cars are not to be treated identically with houses or apartments for
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according to Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Rakas, the
Mimms rule, allowing officers to order drivers out of their vehicle,
would also apply to passengers.84
In Michigan v. Summers,8 5 the Court reviewed whether police
officers could require a suspect to re-enter his house and to remain
there while they conducted a search.86 Detroit police officers
obtained a search warrant for contraband thought to be located in
Summers' residence, but when they arrived to execute the warrant,
they found Summers coming down the front steps.8 7 The officers
requested his assistance in gaining entry and upon his refusal,
Summers was detained while they searched the premises. 88 After
finding narcotics and ascertaining that Summers owned the house,
the police arrested him, searched his person, and found heroin in
89
his coat pocket.
The crucial issue in Summers was whether the initial detention
of Summers violated his constitutional right to be secure against an
unreasonable search and seizure of his person 0 Although the
evidence suggested no special danger to the police, the Court found
that execution of a warrant to search for narcotics may lead to
Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 148 (citing United States v. Chadwick 433 U.S. 1, 12
(1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 590 (1974)). One's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its
operation are significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom
in one's residence. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 561.
84. Id. Following Justice Powell's concurring view in Rakas, Wilson's Fourth
Amendment right would not have been violated when Officer Hughes ordered him out of the
vehicle after he was validly stopped for a traffic infraction. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886. Thus,
the Mimms rule would extend to passengers, in addition to drivers. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 112.
85. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
86. Summers, 452 U.S. at 693.
87. Id. Upon arriving at the house, Officer Roger Lehman saw Summers go out the
front door and proceed across the porch and down the steps. Id. (citing Justice Moody's
opinion for the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Summers, 286 N.W.2d 226, 226-27
(Mich. 1979)).
88. Id. When Summers was asked to open the door, he replied that he could not
because he had left his keys inside, but he could ring someone over the intercom. Id. (citing
People v. Summers, 286 N.W.2d 226, 226-27 (Mich. 1979)). Dwight Calhoun came to the door,
but he refused to admit the officers, whereupon the officers forced open the front door. Id.
89. Id. The eight occupants of the house were detained and a search of the premises
revealed two plastic bags of suspected narcotics under the bar in the basement. Id. (citing
People v. Summers, 286 N.W.2d 226, 226-27 (Mich. 1979)). Officer Conant arrested Summers,
as the owner of the house, for violation of the Controlled Substance Act of 1971, Micl CoMP.
LAws § 335.341(4)(a) (1971). (The Michigan legislature later repealed the Controlled
Substances Act. 1978 MICH. PuB. AcTS, No. 368 § 25101 (Sept. 30, 1978)). Officer Conant then
conducted a custodial search which revealed a plastic bag containing 8.5 grams of heroin in
Summer's jacket pocket. Id.
90. Summers, 452 U.S. at 694.
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sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence,
and that detention of the occupants minimizes the risk of harm to
both the police and the occupants during the searchf' Under the
Fourth Amendment, the Court held that a warrant to search for
contraband founded on probable cause implies a limited authority
for the police to detain the occupants of the premises while they
conduct a proper search.92 The Court concluded that because it
was lawful to require Summers to re-enter and remain in the house
until evidence establishing probable cause to arrest him was found,
his arrest and the search incident thereto were constitutionally
93
permissible.
In Michigan v. Long,9 4 the Supreme Court considered whether a
police officer could protect himself by conducting a "Terry-type"
search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle during a lawful
investigatory stop of the occupant of the vehicle.9 5 Two police
officers observed a speeding car swerve into a ditch and stopped to
investigate. 96 Long, the car's only occupant, met the officers at the
rear of the car and appeared to be "under the influence of
something."97 As Long walked toward the open car door, officers
followed and saw a hunting knife on the floorboard as well as an
object protruding from beneath the armrest.98 Upon lifting the
91. Id. at 702-703 (citing 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.9, pp. 150-51 (1978)). The
Court held that some seizures significantly less intrusive than an arrest have withstood
scrutiny under the reasonableness standard embodied in the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 697.
In these cases, the intrusion on the citizen's privacy was so much less severe than that
involved in a traditional arrest that the opposing interests in crime prevention and detection
and in the police officer's safety could support the seizure as reasonable. Id. at 697-98. The
Court found exceptions to the general rule that every arrest, and every seizure having the
essential attributes of a formal arrest, is unreasonable unless supported by probable cause,
the key principle of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness - the balancing of competing
interests. Id. at 701, n.12.
92. Id. at 705. The Court speculated that special circumstances, or possibly a
prolonged detention, might lead to a different conclusion in an unusual case. Id. Justice
Stewart's dissenting opinion found that the rules of Terry v. Ohio and United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce do not represent some sort of exemplary balancing test for Fourth
Amendment cases; rather, they represent two isolated exceptions to the general rule that the
Fourth Amendment itself has already performed the constitutional balance between police
objectives and personal privacy. Id. at 706. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
95. Id.
96. Id. The two police officers were conducting a routine patrol of a rural area when
they observed the suspect vehicle traveling at excessive speed in an erratic manner. Id.
97. Id. Long did not respond to initial requests to produce his license and registration.
Id.
98. Id. After the officers observed the knife, they stopped Long and subjected him to a
patdown search, which revealed no weapons. Id.

1022

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 36: 1011

armrest, the officers found marihuana. 99 Police subsequently
impounded the vehicle and more marihuana was found in the
trunk.100

The Court stated that the protection of police and third parties
can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief
that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside encounters between
police and suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may
arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area
surrounding a suspect. 01' The Court concluded that a search of the
passenger compartment of an automobile is permissible if the
officer possesses a reasonable belief, based on specific and
articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences arising
from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer's belief that the
suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of
weapons.1°2 The Court's rationale in Long was similar to that in
Terry and Mimms, balancing the public interest in officer safety
and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by officers. °3 Thus, the Court opined that a protective
search of a vehicle's passenger compartment during a lawful
investigatory stop is both reasonable and constitutional if the
investigating officer reasonably believes that the suspect is
potentially dangerous. °4
The personal liberty rights which the Fourth Amendment
protects should not be arbitrarily disregarded. The Court in Wilson
did just that - Justice Rehnquist extended the rule of Mimms to
passengers, blatantly violating passengers' Fourth Amendment
rights. A passenger's right to be free of arbitrary interference by
police is firmly rooted in precedent holding that a police officer
99. Long, 463 U.S. at 1032.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1049. The Court's decision rested in part on its view of the danger presented
to police officers in "traffic stop" and automobile situations. Id. at 1048. According to one
study, approximately 3096 of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a
suspect seated in an automobile (citing Allen P. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings -- A
Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRi . L.C. & P.S. 93 (1963)).
The Court also recognized that suspects may injure police officers and others by gaining
access to weapons, even though they may not themselves be armed. Long, 463 U.S. at 1048.
The Court reasoned that a gun on a table or in the passenger compartment of an automobile
can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested. Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1051. "The balance clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police to conduct
an area search of the passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they possess
an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous." Id.
104. Long, 463 U.S. at 1053.

1998

Wilson
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may order both drivers and passengers to exit the vehicle only if he
105
has an articulable suspicion of danger to himself or third parties.
The Mimms rule eliminated the suspicion of foul play requirement
by justifying the ordering of a driver out of his vehicle, regardless
of whether police have any individualized basis to fear the driver.106
Wilson goes a step further by authorizing an officer to order
passengers out of an automobile when not even a scintilla of
10 7
evidence exists of any potential risk to the police officer.
The Wilson Court rationalized its decision by using a balancing
test, finding that the need to ensure officer safety outweighs the
personal liberty interest at stake.08 However, this decision probably
will not diminish the number of assaults and fatalities suffered by
officers during traffic stops. 109 Officer safety is very important, but
so is the personal liberty interest of innocent citizens. The Court
improperly de-emphasized an innocent passenger's right to personal
security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.
An officer can justify ordering the driver out of his automobile
due his being the subject of the traffic violation for which he or
she was legitimately stopped. Although probable cause may exist to
believe that this driver has committed a minor traffic infraction, no
10
such reason to stop or detain the passengers is so apparent.
Perhaps an officer may be justified in ordering a driver out of the
vehicle without any individualized suspicion, as the Court held in
Mimms; however, this rule should not be extended universally to
innocent passengers.
Brian M. Silver

105. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
106. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 106. The dissent would have found that the officer's action
must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place, but found no relation between the expired license plate and the order to step
out of the car. Id. at 113-114.
107. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 887. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 885.
109. Id. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Traffic stops may be dangerous encounters; in
1994, eleven officers were killed and 5,762 officers assaulted during traffic pursuits and
stops. Id. However, these statistics do not indicate how many of the incidents were
attributable to passengers. Id. In Maryland, this decision will be of some possible advantage
to police in only about one out of every twenty thousand traffic stops in which there is a
passenger in the car. Id. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 889. (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The Constitution should not be read to permit
law enforcement officers to order innocent passengers about simply because they have the
misfortune to be seated in a car whose driver has committed a minor traffic offense." Id.

